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ABSTRACT
Most deep learning frameworks require users to pool their local
data or model updates to a trusted server to train or maintain a
global model. The assumption of a trusted server who has access
to user information is ill-suited in many applications. To tackle
this problem, we develop a new deep learning framework under an
untrusted server setting, which includes three modules: (1) embed-
ding module, (2) randomization module, and (3) classifier module.
For the randomization module, we propose a novel local differ-
entially private (LDP) protocol to reduce the impact of privacy
parameter ϵ on accuracy, and provide enhanced flexibility in choos-
ing randomization probabilities for LDP. Analysis and experiments
show that our framework delivers comparable or even better perfor-
mance than the non-private framework and existing LDP protocols,
demonstrating the advantages of our LDP protocol.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies→ Artificial intelligence; Natu-
ral language processing; Neural networks; • Security and pri-
vacy→ Domain-specific security and privacy architectures;
Privacy protections.
KEYWORDS
Privacy-preserving; neural representations; natural language pro-
cessing.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of deep learning (DL) has led to notable success in
natural language processing (NLP), meanwhile, a series of privacy
and efficiency challenges arise [3, 9, 11]. In NLP tasks, the input
text often provides sufficient clues to portray the authors, such as
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their genders, ages, and other important attributes. Concretely, sen-
timent analysis tasks often impose privacy-related implications on
the authors whose text is used to train models, and user attributes
can be easily detectable from online review data, as evidenced by [9].
Private information can take the form of key phrases explicitly con-
tained in the text. However, it can also be implicit [16]. For example,
the input representation after the embedding layer, or the interme-
diate hidden representation may still carry sensitive information
which can be exploited for adversarial usages. It has been justified
that an attacker can recover private variables with higher than
chance accuracy, using only the hidden representation [3, 11]. Such
attack would occur in scenarios where end users send their learned
representations to the cloud for grammar correction, translation,
or text analysis tasks [11].
To protect privacy, previous efforts resorted to a trusted aggre-
gator to ensure centralized DP (CDP) [1]. On the other hand, when
participants are reluctant to directly share their crowd-sourced data
with the server, federated learning becomes a promising learning
paradigm that pushes model training to the edge [14]. However,
running complex deep neural networks (DNNs) with millions of pa-
rameters comeswith resource limitations and user experience penal-
ties. Moreover, most federated learning frameworks still assume a
trusted aggregator who can have access to local model parameters
or gradients [14]. The recent work pointed out the limitation of the
trusted server and the associated privacy issues [12, 13]. Without an
untrusted server, Shokri and Shmatikov [17] proposed to blur local
model gradients by adding noise using differential privacy. However,
their privacy bounds are given per-parameter, the gigantic amount
of model parameters prevents their technique from providing a
meaningful privacy guarantee. The other cryptograph-based meth-
ods can be resource-hungry or overly complex for users [2]. More
recently, Li et al. [11] and Coavoux et al. [3] proposed to train deep
models with adversarial learning. However, both works provide
only empirical privacy, without any formal privacy guarantees.
To address the aforementioned problems, we are inspired to take
a different approach by utilizing LDP. Our contributions include:
• We are the first to train on differentially private crowd-
sourced representations for NLP tasks. We propose a novel
LDP protocol to preserve the privacy of the extracted repre-
sentation from user inputs. It offers enhanced flexibility in
choosing the randomization probabilities in LDP.
• Experimental results on various NLP tasks show that our
framework delivers comparable or even better performance
than the non-private framework, and our LDP protocol demon-
strates advantages over the existing LDP protocols.
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2 PRELIMINARIES AND RELATEDWORK
2.1 Local Differential Privacy (LDP)
For the scenario where data are sourced from multiple individuals,
while the server is untrusted, LDP [7] is needed to enable data
owners to perturb their private data before publication. LDP roots
in randomized response [20], and it has been deployed in many
real-world applications such as Google’s Chrome browser, Apple’s
iOS, and US Census Bureau. A formal definition of LDP is provided
in Definition 2.1.
Definition 2.1. A randomized algorithm A satisfies ϵ-LDP if
and only if for any two input tuples v and v ′, we have
Pr{A(v) = o} ≤ exp(ϵ) · Pr{A(v ′) = o}
for ∀o ∈ Ranдe(A), where Ranдe(A) denotes the set of all possible
outputs of the algorithm A.
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Figure 1: Deep Learning with CDP and LDP.
Compared to CDP [1, 8], LDP offers a stronger level of protec-
tion. As illustrated in Figure 1, in DL with CDP, the trusted server
owns the data of all users [1], and the server implements CDP algo-
rithm before answering queries from end users. This approach can
pose a privacy threat to data owners when the server is untrusted.
Moreover, DL algorithms with CDP are inherently computationally
complex [1]. By contrast, in DL with LDP, data owners are willing
to contribute their data for social good, but do not fully trust the
server, so it necessitates data perturbation before releasing it to the
server for further learning.
2.2 LDP Protocols
The most relevant LDP protocol is called Unary Encoding (UE),
which consists of two steps [19]:
Encoding. Any single inputv is encoded into a d-bit vector (d is
domain size), where only the v-th bit equals to 1, i.e., ®B= Encode(v),
such that B[v]=1 and B[i]=0 for i ̸= v . Hence each d-bit vector
contains d − 1 zeros and only 1 one, and the maximum difference
between two adjacent binary vectors is 2, i.e., sensitivity ∆f = 2.
Perturbing. Each bit with value 1 is preserved with probability
p, thus, Perturb( ®B) outputs ®B′ as
Pr [B′[i] = 1] =
{
p, if B[i] = 1
q, if B[i] = 0
(1)
Here two key parameters in perturbation are p = Pr{1 → 1}, the
probability that 1 remains 1 after perturbation, and q = Pr{0 → 1},
the probability that 0 is flipped to 1.
Depending on the choice of p and q, UE based LDP protocols can
be classified into [19]:
Symmetric Unary Encoding (SUE): SUE assumes the proba-
bility that a bit of 1 is preserved (p) equals the probability that a bit
of 0 is preserved (1 − q), i.e., p + q = 1, p = eϵ /∆f1+eϵ /∆f ,q =
1
1+eϵ /∆f .
Optimized Unary Encoding (OUE): OUE optimizes SUE by
using the optimized choices of p,q for ϵ-LDP. Setting p and q can be
viewed as splitting ϵ into ϵ1 + ϵ2 such that p1−p = eϵ1 and
1−q
q = e
ϵ2 .
That is, ϵ1and ϵ2 are the privacy budgets spent on transmitting 1’s
and 0’s respectively. If there are more 0’s than 1’s in the encoded
representation, it is reasonable to allocate as much privacy budget
for transmitting the 0 bits as possible to maintain utility. In the
extreme, setting ϵ1 = 0 and ϵ2 = ϵ gives p = 12 and q =
1
1+eϵ /∆f .
3 DEEP LEARNINGWITH LDP
3.1 Optimized Multiple Encoding (OME)
As both SUE and OUE are dependent on the domain size d , which
may not scale well when d is large. To remove the dependence
on d , we propose a new LDP protocol called Optimized Multiple
Encoding (OME). The key idea is to map each real value vi of the
embedding vector into a binary vector with a fixed size l . Therefore,
for the extracted embedding vector ®v = {v1,v2, · · · ,vr } with r
elements, changing all elements of ®v results in ∆f = 2r in both SUE
and OUE, and ∆f = rl in OME. To enhance flexibility and utility in
OME, we follow the intuition behind OUE [19] to perturb 0 and 1
differently.
In particular, we introduce a randomization factor λ to adjust
the randomization probabilities in OME. As implied in Theorem 1,
by increasing λ, we can decrease q, thus increasing the probability
of keeping the original 0’s. For the value of p, we increase the
probability of preserving the original 1’s for half of the bit vector
while decreasing the corresponding probability for the other half.
In this way, OME maintains both privacy and utility.
Theorem 1. For any inputs v,v ′ and any encoded bit vector B
with sensitivity rl , OME provides ϵ-LDP given
p = Pr{1 → 1} =
{
λ
1+λ , for i ∈ 2n
1
1+λ3 , for i ∈ 2n + 1
(2)
q = Pr{0 → 1} = 1
1 + λe
ϵ
r l
(3)
Proof. Let v and ®B represent an input and its encoded bit rep-
resentation. Given that ®B has a sensitivity of rl , the privacy budget
ϵ needs to be divided by the sensitivity for each bit. By setting
p = Pr{1 → 1} =
{
λ
1+λ , for i ∈ 2n
1
1+λ3 , for i ∈ 2n + 1
q = Pr{0 → 1} = 1
1 + λe
ϵ
r l
1−p = Pr{1 → 0} =
{
1
1+λ , for i ∈ 2n
λ3
1+λ3 , for i ∈ 2n + 1
1−q = Pr{0 → 0} = λe
ϵ
r l
1 + λe
ϵ
r l
Then for any inputs v,v ′, we have
Pr{ ®B |v }
Pr{ ®B |v ′ }
=
∏r l
i=1 Pr{B[i] |v }∏r l
i=1 Pr{B[i] |v ′ }
=
∏
i∈2n Pr{B[i] |v }∏
i∈2n Pr{B[i] |v ′ } ×
∏
i∈2n+1 Pr{B[i] |v }∏
i∈2n+1 Pr{B[i] |v ′ }
≤
(
Pr{1 → 1}
Pr{1 → 0} ×
Pr{0 → 0}
Pr{0 → 1}
) r l
2
i∈2n
×
(
Pr{1 → 1}
Pr{1 → 0} ×
Pr{0 → 0}
Pr{0 → 1}
) r l
2
i∈2n+1
=
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λ
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1
1+λ
×
λe
ϵ
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3.2 Framework Realization
As shown in Figure 2, the general setting for our proposed deep
learning with LDP consists of three main modules: (1) embedding
module outputs a 1-D real representation with length r ; (2) random-
ization module produces local differentially private representation;
and (3) classifier module trains on the randomized binary repre-
sentations to generate a differentially private classifier as per the
post-processing invariance of DP [8]. The detailed training process
is summarised in Algorithm 1.
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Figure 2: General setting for deep learning with LDP.
Algorithm 1 Deep Learning with LDP
1: Embedding: Each user maps its input into a 1-D embedding vector (with
length r ) using a pretrained embedding module (GloVe word embeddings,
BERT, etc), z-score normalization is applied to avoid large values;
2: Encoding: Each element vi ∈ Rr of the normalized representation is
mapped into a binary vector of size l = 1+m +n. The first 1 bit represents
the sign of the input (1 for negative and 0 for positive), the integer and
fraction part are represented by the remainingm and n bits respectively;
3: Merging and perturbation: Each user merges all the r binary vectors
each with length l into a long binary vector with total length r l , which
is then randomized by using our proposed OME in Theorem 1;
4: Train target model: The server trains a differentially private classifier
on all the received noisy representations.
4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
For performance evaluation, we focus on a range of NLP tasks: 1)
sentiment analysis; 2) intent detection; and 3) paraphrase identi-
fication. In these tasks, the original sentences might carry some
sensitive information such as name entities or monetary descrip-
tions. These private information should be protected, meanwhile
the performance for these tasks should not be heavily penalised.
Datasets. For sentiment analysis, we use three datasets: IMDb,
Amazon, and Yelp, derived from [10], where each review is labelled
with a binary sentiment (positive vs. negative). For all sentiment
datasets, we perform a train:test split into 8:2.
Intent detection aims to classify each query into seven intents.
We derive Intent dataset from [4], which consists of 13,784 training
examples and 700 test examples in total.
For paraphrase identification, we use Microsoft Research Para-
phrase Corpus (MRPC) from [6]. This task decides whether given
two sentences are semantically equivalent. Following Wang et al.
[18], we partition this data into train/test (3.7k/1.7k).
Model and Training. To extract the intermediate features, we
use GloVe word embeddings with a dimension size of 50 [15] for
sentiment analysis, and use the pretrained BERT-base [5] for both
Intent and MRPC.
For binary encoding of the extracted features, we use 10 bits (1
bit for the sign, 4 bits for the integer part, and 5 bits for the fraction
part) to represent each element of the embedding vector.
The classifier module is a multi-layer perceptron with 128 hidden
units for sentiment analysis and 768 units for Intent and MRPC. For
all datasets, we train the models for 50 epochs using SGD optimizer
with learning rate 0.01, decay 10−6, momentum 0.9, and a batch
size of 32, and apply a dropout rate of 0.5 on the representation. For
each dataset, we average the results over 20 runs.
Experimental Results.Wefirst compare our local differentially
private NN (LDPNN) with the non-private NN (NPNN), where
the randomization module is removed. Table 1 shows that our
LDPNN delivers comparable or even better results than the NPNN
across various privacy budgets ϵ when the randomization factor
λ ≥ 50. We hypothesise that LDP acts as a regularization technique
to avoid overfitting. We conjecture another important reason is
that the enlarged feature space through encoding produces more
powerful representation than the conventional 1-D output of the
embedding layer. As LDPNN performance is directly related to the
randomization probabilities p and q, the higher p and the lower q,
the lower the randomization of the binary vector, and the better
performance will be expected. When the embedding size r and
encoding size l are fixed, p is determined by the randomization
factor λ, and q is determined by both the privacy budget ϵ and
randomization factor λ, as indicated in Equation 2 and Equation 3.
Hence we next investigate how ϵ and λ impact the model accuracy.
Impact of ϵ . Contrary to the heuristic study in deep learning
with CDP [1], from Table 1, we observe that accuracies are relatively
stable when the privacy budget ϵ is changed within a wide range
of values. The reason lies in the large sensitivity of the encoded
binary representation. When λ is a constant, the large sensitivity rl
in OME weakens the effect of ϵ on the randomization probabilities,
as evidenced by Figure 3 (left), p = {p1,p2} and q of OME keep
Table 1: Accuracy of NPNN and LDPNN using OME.
Parameter Value Accuracy [%]
IMDb Amazon Yelp Intent MRPC
NPNN 70.67 67.50 66.00 94.17 68.38
ϵ (λ = 100)
0.5 65.33 68.00 64.54 91.28 66.91
1 67.33 69.50 66.73 91.35 67.15
5 67.80 71.00 67.50 91.57 70.10
10 69.33 72.50 68.10 91.87 70.15
λ (ϵ = 1)
1 48.00 45.50 42.50 13.00 64.95
10 64.00 65.46 57.81 85.43 66.66
50 66.67 69.21 66.50 90.57 66.91
100 67.33 69.50 66.73 91.35 67.15
nearly consistent when ϵ changes. This also explains high accuracy
even under a very tight privacy budget (e.g. ϵ=0.5).
We also compare with the other two LDP protocols (SUE and
OUE in Section 2.2) on sentiment analysis task. Table 2 shows that
our OME significantly outperforms both SUE and OUE. The reason
lies in the optimized randomization probabilities of OME, as shown
in Figure 3 (left), p and q in both SUE and OUE are fluctuating
around 0.5, causing low accuracies.
Table 2: Comparison with other LDP protocols.
LDP protocols (ϵ = 1) Accuracy [%]
IMDb Amazon Yelp
SUE 55.33 45.50 48.00
OUE 50.67 54.00 51.00
OME(λ = 100, ours) 67.33 69.50 66.73
Impact of λ. For randomization factor λ, according to Equation 3,
without the randomization factor λ, i.e., λ = 1, lower ϵ values
and higher rl values will result in higher q values, which may
compromise utility. To alleviate this problem, OME calibrates the
value of λ to adjust randomization probabilities. As observed in
Figure 3 (right), with the increasing λ, OME can largely decrease
q – the probability of perturbing 0 to 1. Although the probability
p2 of preserving the original 1’s decreases for half of the bit vector,
the corresponding probability p1 increases for the other half. This
partially explains why OME can maintain both privacy and utility.
Overall, all these results show that our OME offers the reduced
impact of the privacy budget ϵ on model accuracy, and significantly
outperforms the most state-of-the-art LDP protocols.
5 CONCLUSION
We formulated a new deep learning framework, which allows data
owners to send differentially private representations for further
learning on the untrusted servers. A novel LDP protocol was pro-
posed to adjust the randomization probabilities of the binary repre-
sentation while maintaining both high privacy and accuracy under
various privacy budgets. Experimental results on a range of NLP
tasks confirm the effectiveness and superiority of our framework.
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